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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL L. NAY and TRACY L.
HANSON,

District Court No. 121600010
Court of Appeals No.: 20141185

Appellants.

JOINT BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-4-103(2)(e) and UT.
R. APP. P. 3 over this appeal from the Amended Judgment, filed December 17, 2014,

(''Nay Judgment"), by the Honorable Wallace A. Lee of the Fifth District Court, Sevier
County, State of Utah, sentencing Nay to a prison term of 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison
and six (6) months in the Sevier County jail and the Amended Judgement, filed December 15,
2014, ("Hanson Judgment"), by the Honorable Wallace A. Lee of the Fifth District Court,
Sevier County, State of Utah, sentencing Hanson to a prison term of 0-5 years in the Utah
State Prison and six (6) months in the Sevier County jail. A copy of the Nay Judgment is
attached hereto as Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. A copy of the
Hanson Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum ''B" and incorporated herein by this
reference.

r·,

\:(;I

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE:

Did the trial court e,r in granting the State's motion to join the two separate defendants'
criminal cases?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court has held as follows:
Granting or denying a severance motion "is a discretionary function of the trial
judge, who must weigh prejudice to the defendant caused by joinder against
considerations of economy and expedition in judicial administration." State v.
Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 (Utah 1977). Accordingly, we grant a trial court that
denies a severance motion "considerable latitude" and reverse only if the trial
court's refusal to sever amounts to "a clear abuse of discretion in that it
sacrifices the defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial."
State v. Benson, 2014 UT App 92, iJ 7, 325 P.3d 855, dting State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350
(Utah 1977); see also State v. Collins, 612 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1980); State v. Balfour, 2008 UT
App 410, iJ10, 198 P.3d 471.

PRESERVATION: This issue was preserved by the granting of the motion which joined the
two (2) trials together.

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A.

U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects,[a] against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
B. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8a-1(4)(a) states as follows:
If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial
together, the court shall order an election of separate trials of separate counts,
grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires.
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STATEMENT OF CASE
Nay was charged by lnfa,mation on January 6, 2012 with one (1) count of Possession of
a Controlled Substance, Marijuana, With Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony; one (1)
count of Production of a Controlled Substance, Marijuana, a third degree felony; Possession
or Use of a Controlled Substance, a class B misdemeanor, and Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R0001-0002. Hanson was charged by Jnfa,mation on
January 6, 2012 with one (1) count of Possession of a Controlled Substance, Marijuana, With
Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony; one (1) count of Production of a Controlled
\

Substance, Marijuana, a third degree felony; Purchase, Transfer, Possession, or Use of a
firearm by Restricted Person a third degree felony; Possession or Use of a Controlled
Substance, a class B misdemeanor, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor. R0001-0002. Nay and Hanson filed for suppression of the evidence, alleging
violations of U.S. CONST. AMEND IV and V and UTAH CONST. ART. I §§7 and 12 on
September 4, 2012. R0043-44; HR0053 1• The matter came for hearing on October 16, 2012.
R0298. On January 7, 2013 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress was filed for
both Hanson and Nay. R0053; HR0065. The Memorandum argued that the search warrant
was supported by a misstatement of fact, such fact being that the informant indicated that
Chad Hanson was present at the residence at the time he allegedly saw the bags of marijuana,
however, defense witnesses testified he was not present at the time alleged by the informant.
RH:0066. Based on this misstatement and the fact that Detective Pearson who signed it did

1

As there are two (2) separate records in this matter all of the information contained in Hanson's record will be
marked with the letters "HR" throughout the brief.
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not present it to the Judge, the search warrant was defective.

On April 30, 2014, the trial

court filed its Memorandum Dedsion and Order on Defendant's Motion to Suppress in which it denied
suppression and proceeded to trial. R0082; HR0084.
During the proceedings, the State filed for joinder of matter of both Nay and Hanson's
pending criminal cases that stemmed from the same incident.

R:0103; HR:0103.

No

evidentiary hearing was held on the question of joinder. On February 17, 2014, Nay filed his
Ol?Jedion to Ol?Jedion to Motion to Join and Memorandum. R0134; HR0134. Nay's Objection argued

that Hanson had more culpability and that the joinder would cause Nay prejudice. R0133.
Hanson's Objection argued that hearsay statements would be presented and that her
incriminating statements could potentially be attacked. HR0133. On March 17, 2014 the trial
court entered its Memorandum Dedsion and Order granting the joinder. R0149; RHOl 46.
On August 14, 2014 the State filed its Trial Information in which Hanson and Nay were
brought to trial on the charges of one (1) count of Possession of a Controlled Substance,
Marijuana, With Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony; one (1) count of Production of a
Controlled Substance, Marijuana, a third degree felony; Possession of a Firearm by a Restricted
Person, a third degree felony; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor.
R0167-0168; HR0167-0168. After trial both Hanson and Nay were found guilty of Possession
of a Controlled Substance, Production of a Controlled Substance, and Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, and Hanson was also convicted of Possession of a Firearm by a Restricted
Person.
On November 25, 2014, sentencing was held. On December 17, 2014 the Amended
Judgment was filed which sentenced Nay to a term of (0-5) zero-five years in the Utah State
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Prison for the Possession of a Controlled Substance, Marijuana, and for the Intent to
Distribute and Production of Marijuana and to $5,000 fine, surcharge, and court security fee
on each count. RH0298. On the Drug Paraphernalia conviction Nay was sentenced to serve
sLx (6) months in the Sevier County Jail on the misdemeanor count, with a fine of $1,000.00
plus the state surcharge and court security fee. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
All confinements were stayed in favor of completion of thirty-six (36) months' probation
under the direction of Adult Probation and Parole, with certain conditions that included fortyfive (45) days in the Sevier County Jail beginning December 1, 2014, with seven[!) days credit
for time served for Nay with all but $950 of the fines and surcharge suspended to be paid at
$50 per month. R0288. On December 24, 2014, Nay timely filed a Notice ofAppeal from the
Judgment entered on December 17, 2014. R0288.
On November 25, 2014, sentencing was held. On December 15, 2014 the Amended
Judgment was filed which sentenced Hanson to a term of (0-5) zero to five years in the Utah
State Prison for the Possession of a Controlled Substance, Marijuana, for the Intent to
Distribute and Production of Marijuana, and for the Possession of a Firearm by a Restricted
Person, all third degree felonies with a five thousand dollar ($5,000) fine, surcharge, and court
security fee on each count. On the Drug Paraphernalia conviction Hanson was sentenced to
serve six (6) months in the Sevier County Jail on the misdemeanor count, with a fine of one
thousand dollars ($1,000.00) plus the state surcharge and court security fee. All sentences were
ordered to run concurrently. All confinements were stayed in favor of completion of thirtysix (36) months' probation under the direction of Adult Probation and Parole, with certain
conditions that included forty-five (45) days in the Sevier County Jail beginning December 1,
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2014, with two (2) days credit for time served for Nay with all but nine hundred and fifty
dollars ($950) of the fines and surcharge suspended to be paid at fifty dollars ($50) per month.
R0288. On December 24, 2014, Hanson timely filed a Notice of Appeal from the Judgment
entered on December 15, 2014. RH0301.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

Motion to Suppress Hearing Held October 16, 2012
A. Testimony of Detective Dwight Jenkins

Detective Dwight Jenkins ("Jenkins") testified he was involved in the execution of the
search warrant involving Hanson, Chad Hanson, and Nay, on January 4, 2012 at Hanson's
home. R0298:8. He testified when the officers arrived at the house those three (3) individuals
were going from the living room to the kitchen. R0298:9. Jenkins testified that he had them
get down on the floor in the kitchen so the residence would be secured. Id. He testified that
they were placed in handcuffs and read their Miranda rights. Id. Jenkins testified that Detective
Pearson and Ekker were there, and some other officers and that Commander Whatcott was
there when he gave Miranda. R0298:10. He testified that he told them that he needed to know
if they understood their rights as he explained them before he went any further. R0298:11.
Jenkins testified that all three (3) individuals indicated they understood their rights. Id. He
testified that this response had to be verbal; he would not accept a nod. Id. Jenkins testified
that he did not ask to speak to any of them until they were at the jail. R0298:12.
He testified that next the officers searched the residence. R0298:12. Jenkins testified
that as they were collecting evidence he had them transported to jail and had advised them of
the charges with which they would likely be charged. Id. He testified these charges were based
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on him discovering marijuana in the living room and the overwhelming odor-enough to
open the windows to air out the house---of burnt marijuana when they entered the house.
R0298:13. Jenkins indicated the charges would likely be the use of marijuana and the
possession of paraphernalia. R0298:13.
He testified that at the jail Chad Hanson said that he did not know about the marijuana
and did not want to talk. R0298: 14. Jenkins then backed up and said Chad Hanson had
initially started talking to them until they started talking about what was found at the residence,
then he did not want to talk to them anymore. Id. He testified that Nay was willing to talk to
them but would not talk to them about anything found at the residence. R0298:15. Jenkins
testified that Nay had made incriminating statements because a backpack had been found in
his vehicle and, when Jenkins went to put some personal property of Nay's into the backpack,
he discovered three (3) jars with a large amount of marijuana inside. R0298:17. He testified
Nay indicated the backpack was his. Id.
Jenkins testified that Hanson was very willing to speak to him and that she had no
hesitation answering his questions. R0298:19-20. He testified Hanson spoke to him about
the marijuana openly and freely and had volunteered information. Id. Jenkins indicated this
interview took place at the sergeant's office, which you have to be buzzed into. R0298:20. He
testified it was clear to Hanson she was in jail. R0298:21. Jenkins testified he estimates the
interview with Hanson took about twenty-five to thirty (25-30) minutes. Id. at p. 21. He
testified Hanson expressed zero anxiety and did not request food or water. R0298:22.
Jenkins testified that the interviews occurred around 7:00 or 7:30 on January 4, 2014.
R0298:22. He testified he did not know the citizen informant in this matter previously.
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R0298:23. Jenkins testified the citizen informant actually brought the information to their
attention, indicating that they had observed something. Id. He testified the informant was
not offered anything for their information. R0298:24. Jenkins testified when they received
information from the citizen informant they investigated. Id. He testified the investigation
was not rushed but they did not put anything off either. R0298:25. Jenkins testified from the
time they received the information from the informant until they served the warrant was only
three (3) hours. Id. He testified any corroboration of statements occurred at the residence
like where the residence was located, what kind it was, etc. R0298:26.
Jenkins testified he presented the affidavit in support of the search warrant to Judge
Lyman. R0298:27. He only spoke to the Judge about the warrant. Id. Jenkins testified the
Judge was very thorough in reviewing the warrant before signing it. R0298:29. He testified
that when he entered the residence Hanson was already in the kitchen. R0298:30. Jenkins
testified that bags were discovered in the living room but that no drugs or paraphernalia were
found on any of the individual's persons. R0298:32.
He testified that Nay's backpack and vehicle were searched. R0298:33. Jenkins testified
that Nay did not consent to his backpack or vehicle being searched but that controlled
substances or paraphernalia were found in the backpack. R0298:34. He testified they were all
interviewed separately and that both Hanson and Nay made incriminating statements.
R0298:35. Jenkins

testified the incriminating statements made by Hanson were

acknowledgment that she had marijuana at the house.

R0298:36.

He testified Hanson

incriminated both Nay and Chad Hanson with her statements. R0298:37. Jenkins testified
the incriminating statement made by Nay were that the backpack that contained marijuana
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was his. Id. He testified the warrant was served on Hanson's residence and she was the only
person who resided there. R0298:38.
B. Testimony of Detective Allen Pearson

Detective Allen Pearson ("Pearson") testified that he was involved in executing the
search warrants on the residence. R0298:42. He testified that Hanson, Nay, and Chad Hanson
were present when he entered the residence. Id. Pearson testified the individuals were already
restrained when he entered the residence and that he heard Jenkins read them their Miranda
rights. R0298:43. He testified that Jenkins recitation of the Miranda rights was correct and
that all three (3) individuals indicated that they understood their rights. R0298:44. Pearson
then assisted with the search of the residence. Id. He testified he was present when the
individuals were interviewed by Jenkins. R0298:45. Pearson testified that Hanson agreed to
speak with them and was very calm. Id. He testified that there was nothing the informant
told them they were not able to corroborate. R0298:46. Pearson testified the informant was
not offered anything and that it took a couple of hours to complete the search of the residence.
R0298:47. He testified he did not know the informant prior to this matter. R0298:48. Pearson
testified they did find marijuana in one pound increments throughout the house along with
plants that were round buds. R0298:54. He testified that Jenkins took the search warrant to
the Judge. R0298:56.
C. Testimony of Donna Maxfield

Donna Maxfield ("Maxfield") testified that Chad Hanson and Hanson are her children
from her first marriage. R0298:58. She testified that she saw Chad Hanson on January 3, 2012
at her home as he was living with her. Id. Maxfield testified he had left early that morning,
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gone to Salt Lake, returned home between four and five p.m. and then went to Hanson's
residence. R0298:59. She testified he returned home from Hanson's for dinner around 7p.m.

Id. Maxfield testified that Chad Hanson did not leave the house the remainder of the evening
and went to bed around 10:30 p.m. Id. She testified on January 3, 2012, she was home,
cleaning up, doing laundry, helping with homework. R0298:60. Maxfield testified that she
teaches classes and on January 4, 2012 she had a client. Id. She testified Chad Hanson was
also home that day and that he spent the afternoon at a friend's house. R0298:61. Maxfield
testified she talked to Hanson on January 3, 2012, because she had been sick and she wanted
to see how Hanson was feeling. R0298:62.
Hanson also testified but after her testimony it was decided by the trial court that her
testimony was a danger to her and the other parties in the case because it could be self incriminating, so it was stricken from the record. Counsel for Nay and Hanson indicated that
they may need to continue the evidentiary hearing once they had seen information regarding
the informant.
II.

Trial August 21-22, 2014
A. Testimony of Detective Dwight Lee Jenkins

Jenkins testified that he worked for the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force. R0303:3.
He testified he has been a police officer for thirty (30) years and was POST certified. R0303:
3-4. Jenkins testified that in the instant matter, he had obtained information that led to the
issuance of a search warrant. R0303:6. He testified the search warrant was for Hanson's
residence. R0303:7. Jenkins testified that he had confirmed the location of the residence prior
to executing the warrant and had driven by. Id. He testified there were two (2) vehicles parked
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at the residence, one in a carport and one on the road. R0303:9. Jenkins testified that both
vehicles were registered to Hanson. Id. He testified that after he drove by the residence he
went back to the task force office and wrote the warrant. Id. Jenkins testified the then took
the warrant to Judge Lyman who reviewed and signed the warrant. Id. He testified he already
had other officers watching the residence while he obtained the warrant and that, once he
obtained the warrant, he and other officers headed to the residence. R0303:10.

Jenkins

testified one (1) of the officers knocked on the door to see if Hanson would answer. R0303:11.
He testified that when the warrant was served on the residence three (3) vehicles were present
and the police did not know how many occupants were in the residence. R0303:12. Jenkins
testified the warrant was served on January 4, 2012, and that it was just getting dark. Id. He
testified that he had joined the officer on the porch and knocked, telling the occupants inside
who they were and that they had a warrant. R0303:13. Jenkins testified the occupants did not
respond and that officers gained entry by Detective Ecker breaking the back door. R0303:14.
He testified that he then entered through the back door and saw three (3) occupants. Id.
Jenkins testified that when he entered the residence the other officers were trying to
get the suspects on the ground so they could search them for weapons. R0303:15. He testified
the occupants were slow to comply with the officers. Id. Jenkins testified the occupants were
identified as Hanson, Chad Hanson, and Nay. R0303:16. He testified that the house was
small so it did not take long to clear the residence. R0303: 17. Jenkins testified that there was
a very strong odor of marijuana in the residence. Id. at p. 18. He testified it was so strong he
opened the front and back door to get some of the smell out so it would not overpower the
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officers who were searching. Id. Jenkins testified that the remainder of a marijuana joint was
smoldering in the living room in an ashtray or plate. Id.
He testified that after Hanson, Chad Hanson, and Nay were searched and handcuffed
he advised them of their Miranda rights. R0303: 19. Jenkins testified that each of the occupants
informed him that they understood their rights. Id. Jenkins testified the occupants were all
then transported to jail. Id. He testified they were arrested for possession of paraphernalia
and marijuana prior to the search. Id. Jenkins testified that he was case agent on this matter
so he would see where all the evidence was taken from, and to identify what evidence should
be seized. R0303:21. He testified he began searching in the living room. R0303: 22. Jenkins
testified that he discovered a marijuana grinder, a vase containing a green leafy substance, and
a digital scale at the residence. R0303:23-24. He testified that inside a backpack he discovered
three (3) Kerr jars and each had a green leafy substance. R0303:24. Jenkins testified he
believed the grinder and vase were on or under the coffee table. R0303:28.
He testified that he discovered a paper bag in the dining room and in the bag was a
green leafy substance. R0304: 7. Jenkins testified he believed the substance in the bag was
marijuana. R0304:11. He also testified that he found marijuana in the bedroom. R0304:14.
Jenkins testified the weapons and ammunition were also found in the bedroom. R0304:21.
He testified they also found a book on how to raise marijuana in the bedroom. R0304:32.
Jenkins testified that Miracle-Gro fertilizer, potting soil, and some small pots for plants were
discovered in the mud room. R0304:35. He testified a small marijuana grow was discovered
in the basement. R0304:37. Jenkins testified three (3) bottles with liquid in them were also
found. R0304:39. He testified that approximately fifteen (15) Kerr jars were discovered in
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the kitchen, only one was taken as evidence. R0304:40. Jenkins testified that he took the Kerr
jar because marijuana had been discovered in a backpack inside of Kerr jars. R0304:41. He
testified that there were many marijuana plants discovered in the basement. R0304:47. Jenkins
indicated that they took the grow lights and all the plants as evidence. R0304:64.
He testified he had an opportunity to speak with Hanson and Nay separately after they
were transported to the jail. R0304:69. Jenkins testified that Hanson was very polite in
demeanor and that she was willing to speak to him. R0304: 70. He testified that Hanson
informed him that the marijuana grow was from California and that it was approximately two
(2) pounds. R0304: 74. Jenkins testified that she told him that they planned to split up the
marijuana, sell it, and then pool the money to pay for the plants. Id. He testified that Chad
Hanson had not done much to help with the grow most of the work had been done by her
and Nay. R0304:75. Jenkins testified that Hanson told him that when the police entered the
residence they were in the process of weighing and bagging the marijuana. R0304: 77.
He testified he had also spoken to Nay, twice, first while he was in booking. Id. Jenkins
testified that he had discovered contact lenses in the backpack that was found along with
paraphernalia and marijuana. Id. He testified he asked Nay if the contacts were his and Nay
confirmed that they did belong to him. Id. Jenkins testified that he had a later conversation
with Nay and Nay admitted the backpack was his. R0304:78. He testified he took the warrant
to Judge Lyman for signature. R0304:84. Jenkins testified that Hanson, Chad Hanson, and
Nay were all read Miranda at the same time. R0304:105.
He testified that the search warrant, Exhibit 28, does indicate that it was Detective
Allen Pearson who presented the warrant to Judge Lyman, but that it was actually he himself
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that presented it to Judge Lyman. R0304:256. Jenkins testified that Pearson had been with

him helping him write the search warrant. R0304:258. He testified that while he was writing
the actually affidavit part of the warrant, Pearson was filing the other information. R0304:259.
Jenkins did not know why Pearson had put his name on the warrant. Id.
He testified that he could smell marijuana as he was heading into the basement.
R0304:335. Jenkins testified that marijuana usually grows from late April to late October and
that it would not survive the winter outside in the mountains. R0304:337.
B. Testimony of Detective Allen Pearson

Detective Allen Pearson ("Pearson") testified that in 2012 he was working with the
Utah Narcotics Task Force. R0304:114. He has been an officer for nineteen years and is well
trained in drugs and is POST certified. Id. Pearson testified he was involved in the search of
Hanson's residence on January 4, 2012. R0304:116. He testified that he had helped Jenkins
search the living room. Id. Pearson testified that a dark colored backpack was discovered with
jars inside that had a substance that was consistent with marijuana in them. Id. He testified
that testing the substances to determine they were marijuana was more reliable than an officer
saying it was marijuana based upon their experience. R0304: 122. Pearson testified he entered
the residence from the side entrance. R0304:123. He testified that when he entered the
residence Hanson, Chad Hanson, and Nay were in the living room. Id. Pearson testified that
he did not recall any weapons being found on the individuals when they were searched.
R0304:124. He testified contact lenses where found in the backpack. R0304:126.
C. Testimony of Commander Jeff Whatcott
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Commander Jeff Whatcott ("Whatcott") testified that he is the Commander of the
Central Utah Narcotics Task Force. R0304:133. He testified he has been in law enforcement
for the last twenty-one (21) years. R0304:134. Whatcott testified he is POST certified and
experienced in the drug world. R0304:135. He testified he was involved in the search of
Hanson's residence on January 4, 2012. Id. Whatcott testified he searched the kitchen for
evidence. Id. He testified he found dried marijuana leaves in a bowl. R0304:136. Whatcott
testified that he observed two (2) or three (3) pair of shoes that were dirty inside the door
when he entered the residence. R0304:150.
D. Testimony of Detective Jason Boots

Detective Jason Boots ("Boots") testified that he was a member of the Central Utah
Narcotics Task Force. R0304:166. He testified that he had tested substances in this matter.
R0304:172. He testified he has been a police officer for over twelve (12) years. R0304:156.
Boots testified that he is trained in drug recognition. Id. He also testified that he is certified
to test marijuana. R0304:157. Boots testified he has to recertify every year. Id. Boots testified
that he retrieved the evidence from the Millard County Sheriffs Office. R0304::173. He
testified that he then tested the evidence next door at the Millard County Sheriffs Office lab.
R0304:17 4. Boots testify that the tests he performed on the marijuana are accepted as reliable
in the scientific community. R0304:177. The court found that Boots qualified to be an expert

in the area of marijuana chemical testing. R0304:187.
E. Testimony of Chad Hanson

Chad Hanson ("Chad") testified that he is Hanson's brother. R0304:217. He testified
that the bags of marijuana that had been sitting on the table as he entered the courtroom were
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all his. R0304:218. Chad testified the bag of Miracle-Gro potting soil was his as well. Id. He
testified he was at Hanson's residence on January 4, 2012 when officers entered it along with
Nay. R0304:219. Chad testified that Nay is his cousin. Id. He testified that he was walking
towards the kitchen when six (6) to eight (8) officers broke through the door. R0304:220.
Chad testified the three (3) Kerr jars found in Nay's backpack where his because he put them
there when the police entered the residence. R0304:221. He testified that he was sitting on
the floor next to the coffee table weighing out bags of marijuana when the police knocked on
the door. Id. Chad testified that the substance in the bags was marijuana. R0304:222. He
testified that Nay had nothing to do with the marijuana that was found, he was there smoking
the marijuana that day but that was all. R0304:224. Chad testified Nay had nothing to do with
the marijuana grow discovered in the basement. R0304:225. He testified that Hanson also
had nothing to do with any of the marijuana in the residence, it was all his in the basement,
everywhere. Id. Chad testified that the marijuana grow was his operation and that he had it
at his sisters because he could not do it at his mother's residence where he was residing.
R0304:227. He testified when he started the marijuana grow his sister did not know about it
and that when she learned about it she wanted them out of the house. R0304:228. Chad
testified that he had only been growing plants for two (2) or three (3) weeks. R0304:229. He
testified that he had grown two (2) plants in the mountains and then transported them to
Hanson's residence. R0304:230. Chad testified he bought marijuana in addition to growing
because he could not grow the quality of the marijuana he had purchased. R0304:232. He
testified he wanted chronic or really good marijuana. R0304:233.
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Chad

testified

his

intent was to sell the marijuana. R0304:224. He testified he was read his Miranda rights.
R0304:239.
F. Testimony of Michael Nay

Nay testified to several exhibits as not belonging to him. R0304:270-271. He testified
that he did not use the Miracle-Gro for anything at Tracy's home. R0304:271. Nay testified
that sandwich bag, box, some bowls, and the scale where not his. R0304:272. He testified he
did not help gather any of the marijuana. Id. Nay testified he did not help portion out the
marijuana or put it into baggies. Id. He testified the three (3) Kerr jars were not his but they
were in his backpack. R0304:273.

Nay testified that the photograph did appear to be his

shoes but that the fan and heater where not his. R0304::27 4. He testified he was present when
the police entered the residence. R0304:27 5. Nay testified that he had only gone to the
residence to visit after a snowboarding trip to Salt Lake. R0304:27 6. He testified he was
smoking marijuana he had gotten from Chad Hanson that day. R0304:277. Nay testified the
marijuana they smoked was quite strong and that he had nothing to do with the cultivation of
the marijuana in the basement. Id.
He testified he had gone to the house just to catch up with Chad and Hanson after he
had been snowboarding at Brighton in Salt Lake. R0304:282. Nay testified he was living with
his father and working at Pizza Hut at the time. R0304:284. He testified that he was waiting
with Chad at Hanson's house for her to com~ home on January 4, 2012. R0304:287. Nay
testified they entered the house when Hanson arrived and took off their boots so snow would
not get everywhere. Id. He testified that after they sat down Chad asked if they wanted to
smoke a marijuana joint and he had the marijuana in a red duffel bag. Id. Nay testified he had
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only smoked marijuana every once in a while. R0304:289. He testified that Chad pulled out
marijuana, ground it up, and asked if they wanted to smoke. R0304:290. Nay testified that
Hanson was a little hesitant to smoke and that he did not know the house had a basement. Id.
He testified he had not seen Chad stuff the marijuana in his backpack because he was looking
out the window to see who was pounding on the door. R0304:292.
G. Testimony of Tracy Hanson

Hanson testified that she had reviewed the police report but does not remember what
she said in the interview with the officers. R0304:297. She testified that she does remember
the officers coming into her home, yelling, with guns drawn. Id. Hanson testified she could
not confirm or deny what Jenkins testified she said in the interview because she does not
remember. R0304:299. She testified she believes she did not admit to anything because they
are not true. Id. Hanson testified that she, Chad, and Nay had smoked marijuana that day.
R0304:300. She testified the marijuana really affected her and that the drugs and paraphernalia
that was found was all Chad's. Id. Hanson testified that the bowls, bags, grinder, and scale,
were all Chad's. R0304:301. She testified she had nothing to do with the marijuana grow, she
did not even want it in the house. R0304:302. Hanson testified she had no intention to sell
the marijuana. R0304:304. She testified the book found in her room about the marijuana was
Chad's she was reading the section on penalties to him so he would leave and take the
marijuana with him. R0304:306. Hanson testified she told Chad to leave with the marijuana
as soon as she saw him open the duffel bag and discovered what it was. R0304:315. She
testified he refused to leave and he was bigger than her so she could not force him to do so.
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R0304:315. Hanson testified that he then pulls out a scale, helps himself to bowls in her
kitchen, and starts measuring and weighing the marijuana. Id.
She testified she continued to object to him and the marijuana being there. R0304:316.
Hanson testified she looked out and saw Officer Mickelson who was in his uniform she was
familiar with him due to an incident at work. R0304:320. She testified she turned to Chad
and was really mad at him. R0304:321. Hanson testified she remembers nothing after she was
placed in handcuffs. R0304:322.
H. Verdict

The jury found Nay guilty of production of a controlled substance, marijuana,
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. R0304:338-339. The jury found Hanson guilty of production of a controlled
substance, marijuana, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession
of a firearm by a restricted person, and possession of drug paraphernalia. R0304:339.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in allowing this matter to be joined. Nay and Hanson should have
had separate trials. While both were arrested at the same time and in the same place and had
the same drug charges of one (1) count of Possession of a Controlled Substance, Marijuana,
With Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony; one (1) count of Production of a Controlled
Substance, Marijuana, a third degree felony; Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a
class B misdemeanor, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; however,
Hanson had a much higher degree of culpability, which caused Nay to be prejudiced. It was
her home, her brother and the marijuana plants were found in her basement. Hanson also
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had the additional charge of possession of a weapon by a restricted person. This allowed her
to be seen with a greater deal of culpability than Nay and such culpability was easily but
wrongfully transferred to Nay in the eyes of the jury based only on his presence when the
warrant was served. Hanson also should have had a separate trial from Nay so that any of his
testimony could not be used to incriminate or prejudice Hanson as is argued more specifically
herein and below.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S MOTION TO
JOIN THE MATTERS OF HANSON AND NAY.
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8a-1(4)(a) states as follows regarding bifurcation and joinder

of defendants:
If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial
together, the court shall order an election of separate trials of separate counts,
grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires.
In State v. Jok our appellate court analyzed joinder of defendants who "are alleged to have
participated in the same act or conduct or in the same criminal episode." Ibid., 2015 UT 90,

,i13, 348 P.3d 385, dting UTAH CODE .ANN.§ 77-8a-1(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2012). "When two or
more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the
court in its discretion on motion or otherwise orders separate trials consistent with ~e
interests of justice." Id., ctiing UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8a-1(2)(d). If the trial court "finds a
defendant ... is prejudiced" by the joinder of defendants it "shall ... grant a severance of
defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires." Id. § 77-8a-1(4)(a).
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This Court has indicated that "even offenses otherwise properly joined must be severed
if necessary to prevent prejudice to the defendant ... " State v. Benson, 2014 UT App 92, ,I16,
325 P.3d 855, citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8a-1(4)(a) (LexisNexis 2008). However, it has
noted that, "[t]he burden of demonstrating prejudice is a difficult one, and the ruling of the
trial [court] will rarely be disturbed on review. The defendant must show something more than
the fact that a separate trial might offer him a better chance of acquittal." Id., citing Smith, 927
P.2d at 653-54 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court determined that, "[t]o analyze prejudice, the court must determine 'whether
evidence of the other crime[s] would have been admissible in a separate trial."' State v. Jimenet;
2013 UT App 76, ,IS, 299 P.3d 1158, citing State v. Ba!four, 2008 UT App 410, ,I21, 198 P.3d
471. A two-step process was created. 'We must first determine whether the offenses were
properly joined." State v. Lamb, 2013 UT App 5, ,I6, 294 P.3d 639, citing State v. Burke, 2011 UT
App 168, ,I19, 256 P.3d 1102. 'We must then determine whether the offenses should
nonetheless have been severed due to any prejudice that may have resulted by their joinder."

Id.
A. Joinder Mislead the Jur_y and Resulted in Confusion of the Charges Against
Each Separate Individual.
UT. R. EVID. 403 states that, "the court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury ... "

UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8a-1(4)(a) states as

follows:

If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial
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together, the court shall order an election of separate trials of separate counts,
grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires.
In State v. O'Brien the Utah Supreme Court held as follows:
As was observed in State v. Collins [612 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1980)] Doubts
concerning prejudice should be resolved by the trial court in favor of a
defendant. ... " Notwithstanding that admonition, trial courts often appear to be
reluctant to grant severance in cases involving joint defendants. Such reluctance
is ill-advised and in the long run risks greater expenditure of judicial resources.
Ibid., 721 P.2d 896 (Utah 1986). In State v. Smith it states that, "[a] court should sever charges
when it concludes that "'prejudice to the defendant outweighs considerations of economy and
practicalities of judicial administration, with doubts being resolved in favor of severance."'"
Ibid. 927 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1996), dting State v. JaimeZ; 817 P.2d 822, 825 (Utah App.
1991) (quoting State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444--45 (Utah 1986)).
Furthermore, in U.S. v. Griggs it states that, "a 'severance should be granted when "there
is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the
defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.""'
Ibid., 2012 WL 2121487, dting United States v. Sarradno, 340 F.3d 1148, 1165 (10th Cir.2003)
(additional citation omitted). In U.S v. Wardell it states as follows:
\Vc recognize the Supreme Court's declaration that a risk of prejudice "might

occur" when prejudicial evidence that would be inadmissible against a
defendant, if tried alone, is admitted against a codefcndant in a joint trial.
Z*ro[v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993)t \Xie also acknowledge that such
a 1-isk may be "heightened" when "many defendants arc tried together in a
complex case and they have markedly different degrees of culpability." Id.
Ibid., 591 F.3d 1279, 1300 (10 th Cir. 2009).
Chad testified he was at Hanson's residence on January 4, 2012, when officers entered
it along with Nay. R0304:219. Chad testified that Nay is his cousin. Id. He testified that he
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was walking towards the kitchen when six (6) to eight (8) officers broke through the door.
R0304:220. He testified that he was sitting on the floor next to the coffee table weighing out
bags of marijuana when the police knocked on the door. R0304:221. Chad testified that the
substance in the bags was marijuana. R0304:222.
Chad took responsibility for the bags of marijuana sitting on the table as officers
entered upon serving the warrant. R0304:218. Chad testified the bag of Miracle-Gro potting
soil was his as well. Id. Chad testified the three (3) Kerr jars found in Nay's backpack where
his because he put them there when the police entered the residence. R0304:221. He testified
that Nay had nothing to do with the marijuana that was found, indicating that Nay was there
smoking the marijuana that day, but that was the extent of his involvement. R0304:224. Chad
testified Nay had nothing to do with the marijuana grow discovered in the basement.
R0304:225.
Chad also testified that Hanson also had nothing to do with any of the marijuana in
the residence, it was all his in the basement and everywhere. Id. Chad testified that the
marijuana grow was his operation and that he had it at his sister's because he could not do it
at his mother's residence where he resided. R0304:227. When Chad started growing marijuana
there, his sister did not know about it, but she later learned about it and wanted it all out of
her house. R0304:228.
Nay testified that the drugs and other items on several exhibits did not belong to him.
R0304:270-271. He testified that he did not use the Miracle-Gro for anything at Hanson's
home. R0304:271. Nay testified that sandwich bag, box, some bowls, and the scale where not
his. R0304:272. He testified he did not help gather any of the marijuana. Id. Nay testified he
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did not help portion out the marijuana or put it into baggies. Id.

He testified the three (3)

Kerr jars were not his but they were in his backpack. R0304:273. Nay testified that the
photograph did appear to be his shoes, but that the fan and heater where not his. R0304::27 4.
He testified he was present when the police entered the residence. R0304:27 5. Nay testified
that he had only gone to the residence to visit after a snowboarding trip to Salt Lake.
R0304:276. He testified he was smoking marijuana obtained from Chad Hanson that day.
R0304:277. Nay testified he had nothing to do with the cultivation of the marijuana in the
basement. Id.
Nay had gone to the house to catch up with Chad and Hanson. R0304:282. Nay did
not reside there. R0304:284. Nay did not enter the residence until Hanson arrived, after which
he took of his snowy boots. R0304:287. Chad offered him a marijuana joint from a red duffel
bag. Id. Nay only smoked marijuana every once in a while. R0304:289. Chad pulled out
marijuana, ground it up, and offered it to the others, with Hanson hesitating at the offer.
R0304:290.
Nay did not know the house had a basement. Id. He had not seen Chad stuff the
marijuana in Nay's backpack because he was looking out the window to see who was pounding
on the door when the officers arrived. R0304:292.
Hanson did not remember her the interview with the officers or anything she said.
R0304:297. She remembered officers coming into her home, yelling, with guns drawn. Id.
She could not confirm or deny what Jenkins testified she said in the interview due to lack of
memory. R0304:299. However, she believed she did not admit to anything because the facts
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offered by Jenkins were not true. Id. The marijuana really affected her that day. R0304:300.
Hanson testified she remembers nothing after she was placed in handcuffs. R0304:322.
She, Chad, and Nay had smoked marijuana that day. R0304:300. The drugs and
paraphernalia officers found all belonged to Chad. Id. The bowls, bags, grinder, and scale
were all Chad's. R0304:301. She had nothing to do with the marijuana grow, and did not even
want it in the house. R0304:302. She had no intention to sell the marijuana. R0304:304. The
book found in her room about growing marijuana was Chad's, which she was reading to
educate herself on the penalties to get Chad to leave and take the marijuana with him.
R0304:306.
Hanson told Chad to leave with the marijuana as soon as she saw him open the duffel
bag and discovered what it was. R0304:315. He refused to leave and he was bigger than her,
so she could not force him to do so. R0304:315. Chad then pulled out a scale, helped himself
to bowls in her kitchen, and started measuring and weighing the marijuana. Id. She continued
to object to him and the marijuana being there. R0304:316.
Severance of the trials against Hanson and Nay were necessary to avoid presentation
of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence from one another's trials in order to avoid confusing the
issues and misleading the jury. UT. R. EVID. 403. Nay was simply visiting the residence.
Hanson had more culpability admitting her knowledge of the marijuana plants growing in the
basement, and the book located in her own bedroom regarding growing them. The fact that
Nay was simply using the drugs in a residence where he was unaware there was a basement or
a marijuana grow implicated him through both Chad and Hanson's testimonies in front of a
jury. Although it would seem that Hanson and Chad's testimony's were helpful to Nay in
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trying to draw responsibility from him, their admissions as to their own culpability could easily
undennine their own credibility before the jury. If the jury discounted their version of the facts
based on their own culpability, then it likely led them to believe that they falsely testified about
Nay's involvement. If Hanson and Chad's own culpability were excluded, since that would
have been irrelevant in a separate trial, and they simply testified as to Nay, the outcome would
have been substantially different.
As it pertains to Hanson, the fact that she was unaware of the marijuana growing in
her basement until recent was usurped by the irrelevant evidence that would not have been
admitted in her separate trial. Chad providing what is presumed to be some of the grow from
her basement to both her and Nay, made it appear as though she was dealing in marijuana
under her own roof. Without the irrelevant evidence regarding the fact that Nay was simply a
user and not involved, it would not have appeared that she was providing it to outsiders as a
distributer and her testimony that she was unaware, combined with Chad's would have been
more plausible. However, the jury could easily believe with Nay's facts pertaining only to him
that she was dealing to him.
The court should have ordered a separate trial for the separate defendants pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8a-1(4)(a) since justice required it in order to provide a fair trial free

from irrelevant matters that would confuse the jury as to which defendant committed which
crime. Any doubts concerning prejudice should have resolved in Nay and Hanson's favor.

O'Brien, supra, dting Collins at 777. The trial court should not have been reluctant to grant
severance in a case that required it. Id. It was an ill-advised decision and ran a greater risk of
expenditures of judicial resources if this matter is reversed and sent back for two (2) separate
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trials. Id. Nonetheless, prejudice to both Nay and Hanson is apparent, definitively outweighing
considerations of economy and practicalities of judicial administration. Smith at 653, citing

Jaimez at 825 (quoting Velarde at 444-45). Such prejudice should have been resolved in favor
of severance. Id.
There was a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise both Nay and Hanson's
rights to a fair trial by infusing such trial with irrelevant matters that would have been otherwise
excluded from severed trials. Griggs, supra. The jury's decision is undermined herein given that
it was based on irrelevant matters regarding Nay and Hanson's guilt or innocence that would
not have been admitted at separate trials. Id., citing Sarracino at 1165. Even if a risk of prejudice
was nothing more than a possibility that "might occur" based on inadmissible evidence if tried
alone, this supported severance. Wardell at 1300, citing Zaftro, 506 U.S. at 539. However, the
risk herein was heightened above simply that it "might occur" since Hanson and Nay appeared
to have differing degrees of culpability. Thus, severance should have been ordered. Hanson
and Nay's convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded with direction that
separate trials be held so as to allow them to exclude irrelevant evidence from their trials.

B.

Crawford Applies to Defeat Joinder of the Trials Herein.

Our Utah Court of Appeals has undertaken an analysis of the United States Supreme
Court determination in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177
(2004), which has set the standard for testing the defendant's right to confrontation of
witnesses in criminal cases. In Salt Lake City v. Williams, it was noted that the decision in

Crawford "replaced the existing standard for admission of hearsay statements against a criminal
defendant with a requirement that testimonial statements could be admitted only if the
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declarant was unavailable and if there had been a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
Ibid., 2005 UT App 493, ,r 11, 128 P.3d 47. The prior test did not require an opportunity for
cross-examination, but required only an "indicia of reliability." Id. at

,r 13.

However, the

United States Supreme Court had noted the risk inherent in this, in that "reliability could 'be
inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception"' and thus be allowed. Id. at

,r 13, dting Ohio v.

Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct.

2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), overruled by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Crawford held
that testimonial evidence at issue implicates the Sixth Amendment, "demand[ing] what
common law required." Id. at ,r 14, dting Crawford 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. "[f]he Sixth
Amendment 'commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination."' Id. at ,r 14, dting Crawford,
541 U.S. at 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
Williams noted that Crawford did not provide a definition of "testimonial" but only gave
some examples-not an exclusive list-as guidance to such analysis. Ibid. at ,r,r 11-12. "The
focus of the Confrontation Clause is on witnesses who bear testimony against the accused."
Id. at,I 15. Crawford provided three tests to help guide the determination: (1) "ex parte in-court
testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonable expect to be used prosecutorially"; (2)
"extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions"; and (3) "statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
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would be available for use at a later trial." Id. at if 15, citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124
S.Ct. 1354 (additional citations omitted).

In Crawford, the recorded statement of a wife

implicating her husband "fell within even the most narrow definition of testimonial statements
suggested because she made it while in police custody, herself a potential suspect in the case."

Id. at if 16. The Crawford court found that the statements qualified as testimonial because they
were "[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations." Id. at if 16, citing

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. "The abuse of these examinations was, in large part,
the impetus for the Sixth . Amendment right of a defendant to confront the witnesses against

him." Id. at if 16, citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Because the questioning of
the wife was a police interrogation, Crawford found that "it fell within any of the proposed
definitions of testimonial and did not require further refinement of that standard." Id. at if 16,

citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
Williams pointed to several other jurisdictions who had found statements testimonial in
nature, such as the 10th Circuit's holding that where "a statement is testimonial if a reasonable
person in the position of the declarant would objectively foresee that his statement might be
used in the investigation or prosecution of a crime." Ibid. at if 17, citing United States v. Summers,
414 F.3d 1287, 1302 (10th Cir.2005). In a published in-depth analysis of Crawford, Professor
Josephine Ross proposed that in defining testimonial statements, a court should consider how
the statement is being used in court. See, Josephine Ross, After Crawford Double-Speak:

"Testimony" Does Not Mean Testimony and 'Witness" Does not Mean Witness, 97

J.

Crim. L. &

Criminology 147, 184 (2006). Ross argues that " 'testimonial' should mean statements that
function as testimony during the trial." If the words in the statement "constitute an accusation
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of criminal wrongdoing," the declarant should automatically be considered a witness. Ross
believed this position would reduce the possibility of police officers using subversive tactics
in obtaining witness statements.
In Bruton v. United States, the United States Supreme Court determined the specific issue
present in the instant matter, that of admission of a codefendant's statement against the other
co-defendant when the availablility for confrontation does not exist. Bruton states as follows:
Another reason cited in defense of Delli Paoli is the justification for joint trials
in general, the argument being that the benefits of joint proceedings should not
have to be sacrificed by requiring separate trials in order to use the confession
against the declarant. Joint trials do conserve state funds, diminish
inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing
those accused of crime to trial. But the answer to this argument was cogently
stated by Judge Lehman of the New York Court of Appeals, dissenting in People
v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419,432, 164 N.E. 336,341:
'We still adhere to the rule that an accused is entitled to confrontation
of the witnesses against him and the right to cross-examine them***.
We destroy the age-old rule which in the past has been regarded as a
fundamental principle of our jurisprudence by a legalistic formula,
required of the judge, that the jury may not consider any admissions
against any party who did not join in them. We secure greater speed,
economy and convenience in the administration of the law at the price
of fundamental principles of constitutional liberty. That price is too
high.'
It was enough that that procedure posed 'substantial threats to a defendant's
constitutional rights to have an involuntary confession entirely disregarded and
to have the coercion issue fairly and reliably determined. These hazards we
cannot ignore.' 378 U.S., at 389, 84 S.Ct., at 1787, 12 L.Ed.2d 908. Here the
introduction of Evans' confession posed a substantial threat to petitioner's right
to confront the witnesses against him, and this is a hazard we cannot ignore.
Despite the concededly clear instructions to the jury to disregard Evans'
inadmissible hearsay evidence inculpating petitioner, in the context of a joint
trial we cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute for
petitioner's constitutional right of cross-examination. The effect is the same as
if there had been no instruction at all. See Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350,
356-357, 63 S.Ct. 599, 602, 87 L.Ed. 829; if. Burgett v. State of Texas, 389 U.S.
109, 115, 88 S.Ct. 258,262, 19 L.Ed.2d 319.
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Ibid., 391 U.S. 123, 134-35, 137, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 1627-1628, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968).
Furthermore, in U.S. v. Griggs it states that, "a 'severance should be granted when "there
is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the
defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence."'"

Ibid., 2012 WL 2121487, citing United States v. Saffacino, 340 F.3d 1148, 1165 (10th Cir.2003)
(additional citation omitted). In U.S v. Wardell it states as follows:
\Xie recognize the Supreme Court's declaration that a risk of prejudice "might
occur" when prejudicial evidence that would be inadmissible against a
defendant, if tried alone, is admitted against a codcfendant in a joint trial.
Zq/iro[v. United States, 506 U.S. 534,539 (1993)t \Ve also acknowledge that such
a risk may be "heightened" when "many defendants arc tried together in a
complex case and they have markedly different degrees of culpability." Id.

Ibid., 591 F.3d 1279, 1300 (10 th Cir. 2009).
"It reasons that if a witness cannot recall what occurred, he or she is consequently a
witness who is not credible." State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1144 (UT 1989). UT. R. EVID
601 states as follows, "[e]very person is competent to be a witness unless these rules provide
otherwise." In State v. Smith, it states as follows:
As we have previously observed, no particular age nor any specific standard of mental
ability can be set as the qualification far giving testimony, but it is an importantJat1or to be
considered, along with others, in determining whether she should be allowed to
testify. What is essential is that it appear that the child has sufficient intelligence
and maturity that she is able to understand the questions put to her; that she
has some knowledge of the subject under inquiry and the facts involved therein;
that she is able to remember what happened; and that she has a sense of moral
duty to tell the truth. Whether she meets these tests and is therefore a competent
witness is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine.

Ibid., 16 Utah 2d 374, 377, 401 P.2d 445, 447 (1965) (emphasis added.). In State v. Lnng it
discusses what may affect one's perception as follows:
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[I]he more important factors affecting the accuracy of one's perception are
those factors originating within the observer. One such limitation is the
individual's physical condition, including both obvious infirmities as well as
such factors as fatigue and drug or alcohol use. Another limitation which can
affect perception is the emotional state of the observer. Contrary to much
accepted lore, when an observer is experiencing a marked degree of stress,
perceptual abilities are known to decrease significantly. See, e.g., [F. Woocher,
Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan.L.Rev. 969], 979, n. 29.
[(1977)].

Ibid., 721 P.2d 483,490 (UT 1986).
Jenkins testified that Hanson was very willing to speak to him at the jail and that she
had no hesitation answering his questions. R0298:19-21; R0304:70. He testified Hanson spoke
to him about the marijuana openly and freely and had volunteered information. Id. Jenkins
testified the incriminating statements made by Hanson were acknowledgment that she had
marijuana at the house. R0298:36. He testified Hanson incriminated both Nay and Chad
Hanson with her statements. R0298:37. He testified that Hanson informed him that the
marijuana grow was from California and that it was approximately two (2) pounds. R0304: 74.
Jenkins testified that she told him that they planned to split up the marijuana, sell it, and then
pool the money to pay for the plants. Id. He testified that Chad Hanson had not done much
to help with the grow, but that most of the work had been done by her and Nay. R0304:75.
Jenkins testified that Hanson told him that when the police entered the residence they were in
the process of weighing and bagging the marijuana. R0304:77.
Hanson did not remember her the interview with the officers or anything she said.
R0304:297. She remembered officers coming into her home, yelling, with guns drawn. Id.
She could not confinn or deny what Jenkins testified she said in the interview due to lack of
memory. R0304:299. However, she believed she did not admit to anything because the facts
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offered by Jenkins were not true. Id. The marijuana really affected her that day. R0304:300.
Hanson testified she remembers nothing after she was placed in handcuffs. R0304:322. Her
testimony at trial was that she and Nay were not involved in the marijuana grow, and that all
of the evidence obtained by officers belonged to Chad.
The Crauford analysis applies herein to test the parties' right to confrontation of the
witnesses in this criminal case. Ibid., 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In separate trials, Hanson
may have been deemed unavailable as a witness in Nay's trial with regard to the content of her
interviews with Jenkins, which were highly incriminating of Nay. Williams at ,I 11. Hanson was
an "unavailable" witness for her lack of recall of the entire interview itself, at a minimum
lacking in "indicia of reliability." Id. at ,I 13. In order to test this reliability, the testimony must
be subject to cross-examination; however, Nay would have only been able to examine Jenkins
on such matter since Hanson's lack of memory made her unavailable. Thus, this hearsay
testimonial evidence would have been improperly admitted in a separate trial. The assessment
of reliability was severely hampered by joinder. Williams at ,I 14, citing Crauford, 541 U.S. at 61,
124 S.Ct. 1354.
Hanson's interview is testimonial in nature because it bears testimony against Nay.

Williams at ,I 15. Crauford provided three tests to determine the testimonial nature, under which
falls Hanson's custodial examination or similar pretrial statements reasonably expected to be
used by the prosecutor. Id. at ,I 15, dting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (additional
citations omitted). Further, according to Jenkins' testimony, Hanson's prior interview with

him contained a confession "made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." Id. Although
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Nay was not Hanson's husband, her statements were made while interrogated in police
custody and while a potential suspect in the case. Id. at ,r 16. Thus, Hanson's statements qualify
as testimonial in nature, subject to Nay's right to cross-examine. Id. at ,r 16, citing Craeford, 541
U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The potential for abuse during these examinations is, "in large part,
the impetus for the Sixth Amendment right of a defendant to confront the witnesses against

him." Id. at ,r 16, dting Craeford, 541 U.S. at 50-51, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
If Hanson had not been substantially impacted by her marijuana usage and unable to
recall her inte.nriew with Jenkins, she would have objectively foreseen the usage of her
statements in the prosecution against Chad, Nay and herself. Williams at ,r 17, dting Summers at
1302.

The statements were used in court to undermine the credibility of all of the

codefendants and implicate each of them in the crime, although their trial testimony pointed
only to Chad. See, Ross at 184. They functioned as testimony at the joint trial herein. Id. This
process was intended to reduce the possibility of police officers using subversive tactics in
obtaining witness statements; however, by holding a joint trial, this intention was entirely
undermined.
Although arguments have been made that the benefits of joint proceedings should not
have to be sacrificed by severance to use the confession against one codefendant, or that joint
trials conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses or avoid delays, these matters
are insufficient to usurp another codefendant's right to severance. Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 13435, 137, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 1627-1628. As Judge Lehman of the New York Court of Appeals
stated, Nay should not have been subject to Hanson's confession being submitted to his jury
when he was not made a party and did not join in it. Fisher, 249 N.Y. at 432, 164 N.E. at 341.
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Speed, economy and convenience cannot work to deprive Nay of his fundamental principles
of liberty. Bmton, 391 U.S. 123, 134-35, 137, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 1627-1628, citing Fisher at 432.
In essence, by having the trials held in joinder, Nay had an involuntary confession held
against him through Jenkins' hearsay testimony of an interview held outside of Nay's presence,
the likes of which Hanson could neither corroborate nor deny at trial due to lack of memory.

Bmton, 391 U.S. 123, 134-35, 137, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 1627-1628. There was more than a substantial
threat to Nay's constitutional rights, which cannot be ignored. Id. Even a limiting instruction
would have been insufficient to substitute for Nay's constitutional rights. Id.; see Anderson, 318
U.S. at 356-357, 63 S.Ct. at 602; if. Bu,g,ett, 389 U.S. at 115, 88 S.Ct. at 262.
Severance should have been granted since there was a serious risk that Nay's right to
cross-examination, subject to Hanson's interview with Jenkins that she could not recall, would
allow an involuntary confession of his own guilty or innocence to be presented to the jury in
an unreliable manner. Griggs, citing Sarracino at 1165. If Hanson could not recall what occurred
in her interview, she would be a non-credible witness against Nay. However, a jury would want

to find her statements to Jenkins credible, so they would naturally find the ones about Nay
credible as well in a joint trial where her testimony would be admissible. Johnson at 1144.
Although every person is competent to be a witness, Hanson's mental ability would have been
set as a qualification for giving testimony in Nay's trial, and would have been an important
factor to consider in whether she should be allowed to even testify at his separate trial. UT. R.
EVID

601; Smith, 16 Utah 2d at 377,401 P.2d at 447.
Further, Hanson's own perception originated within her, affecting the accuracy of her

perception. Lbng at 490. At the time of her interview, Hanson was suffering an obvious
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infirmity through her prior drug usage. Id. Her perceptual ability was significantly decreased.

Id.; see, e.g., Woocher at 979, n. 29.
Thus, Hanson's interview with Jenkins was highly susceptible to being excluded in a
separate trial for Nay. It contained an involuntary confession, was not subject to significant
cross-examination given Hanson's diminished perception of the events at the time based on
her drug-usage infirmity. The jury in this joint trial was inclined to give her confession to
Jenkins credibility, which required that they also find Nay guilty although he was not part of
that process or interview, rather than determining his guilt or innocence based only on
admissible evidence. Thus, severance was required and the trial court's error dictates that the
convictions be reversed with direction on remand to sever these defendants and provide them
with separate trials in further protection of Nay's right to cross-examination and to be free
from consideration of scandalous involuntary confessions that he cannot adequately challenge
due to Hanson's lack of memory.

C.

Severance was Required in Order to Protect the Co-Defendant's Due Process
Rights.
In West Valley Ciry v. Hutto it states as follows:
Hearsay is defined under Rule 801(c) as "a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay statements are
''general!} excluded as evidence on the ground that, since the statements are not made under
oath, and often onfy the witness to the declaration-not the declarant-is available for crossexamination at trial the statement is generalfy unreliable." S fate v. Mickelson, 848 P .2d
677,683 (Utah Ct.App.1992). See State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Utah 1989).

Ibid. 2000 UT App. 188, ,I10, 5 P.3d 1 (emphasis added). In State v. Eldredge it states as follows:
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 requires the exclusion of evidence if its potential for
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probativeness. Under that rule, the
question is whether the hearsay evidence was sufficiently unreliable that it
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should have been obvious to the trial judge that the testimony's probativeness
was substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.

Ibid., 773 P.2d 29, 36(UT 1989).
Bruton, supra, also protects a defendant's Due Process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, and likewise the state provisions under UTAH
CONST. ART. I§§ 7 and 12. Ibid., 391 U.S. 123, 134-35, 137, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 1627-1628, 20 L.
Ed. 2d 476 (1968). The basis of Bruton was to protect defendants from being convicted on
unreliable statements, noting the unfair prejudice attendant a defendant having to trust juries
to disregard their codefendant's confession implicating them in their determination of the
defendant's guilt or innocence. Bruton's holdings indicate the risk associated with juries and
their inability to follow a judge's instructions when it pertains to a statement that can be used
against one defendant but not another. The Court found that these statements are inherently
unreliable given the strong motivation for a defendant, or even those testifying as to their
statements, to shift the blame onto others. The use of unreliable hearsay used to convict a
defendant violates the Due Process Clause. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; UTAH CONST. A.RT.
I§§ 7 and 12; UT. R. EVID. 801-807. This is particularly egregious where there is insufficient
evidence to sustain a conviction outside those statements.
As argued supra, Hanson's statements made to Jenkins in the interview that she cannot
recall was presented as hearsay at the joint trial herein. UTAH R. EVID. 801(c). These types of
statements are generally excluded since they are not made under oath by the person who stated
them. Hutto at ,ItO, tiling Mickelson at 683; Cude at 1199. This undermines the statement's
reliability. Additionally, an involuntary confession presented through hearsay testimony of an
officer and elicited from a codefendant who currently lacks memory of having ever stated such

37

presents a heightened potential for unfair prejudice that is substantially outweighed by any
probativeness. Eldredge at 36, ctiing UT. R. EVID. 403. This information was sufficiently
unreliable.
Our United States Supreme Court entered Bruton's holdings for the purpose of

protecting defendants from having to trust juries to disregard their codefendant's confession,
particularly those which by nature implicates them. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 134-35, 137, 88 S. Ct.
at 1627-1628, dting UTAH CONST. ART. I §§ 7 and 12; U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV. Our
jurisprudence does not allow for a person to be convicted on their codefendant's confession
implicating them before the jury who is set to determine their guilt or innocence. Id. Bruton's
holdings specifically acknowledge the risk associated with a jury's inability to follow a judge's
instructions when it pertains to a statement that can be used against one defendant but not
another. Ibid. For this reason, these statements are deemed inherently unreliable given the
strong motivation for a defendant like Hanson or Nay, or even those testifying as to their
statements such as Jenkins, to shift the blame onto others.
The use of unreliable hearsay in this joint trial was used to convict both defendants and
thus violates the Due Process Clause. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; UTAH CONST. ART. I §§ 7
and 12; UT. R. EVID. 801-807. There was no other evidence tying Nay or Hanson to the drugs,
particularly given Chad's testimony taking complete responsibility. The statements utilized by
Nay and Hanson against one another in the joint trial were particularly egregious where there
was insufficient evidence to sustain the nexus to distribution and the other charges outside
those statements.
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The trial court should have ordered severance or bifurcation of the defendants' criminal
cases herein. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-8a-1(4)(a). The defendants were prejudiced by joinder
for trial and the trial court should have elected to separate the trials. Id. Although Nay and
Hanson are alleged to have participated in the same criminal episode, and thus were to be tried
jointly, on motion the trial court herein should have ordered separate trials in the interest of
justice. Jok at ,I13, dting UTAH CODE ANN.§ 77-8a-1(2)(b). Both defendants were prejudiced
by the joinder requiring severance. Id.§ 77-8a-1(4)(a); Benson at ,I16, dting UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-8a-1(4)(a). Defendants have sufficiently evidenced more than just a better chance of
acquittal by showing that the errors were of a constitutional nature, undermining their right to
a fair trial altogether, whether through irrelevant evidence being admitted, infringing upon
their right to cross-examination, or through Due Process violations.
Evidence specific to one another's crimes would not have been admissible in separate
trials, as argued more particularly supra. Jimenez at ,IS, citing Balfour at ,I21. The defendants were
not properly joined and should have been severed due to the prejudice that did result from
the joinder. Lamb at ,I6, dting Burke at ,I19. Thus, Nay and Hanson's convictions should be
reversed in favor of severance on remand to afford them their constitutional rights that have
been violated by the joinder.
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Hanson and Nay respectfully requests that
this Court reverse both the .1.\mended Judgment, filed December 17, 2014, and the Amended

Judgement, filed December 15, 2014, and take any such further action as this Court deems
necessary.
DATED this 24th day of November 2015.
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Addendum ,_A,_
Amended Judgment, filed December 17, 2014
("Nay Judgment")

.(::-;·~;;:.:>·\,

Tb• Order of Court is stated below:
Dated: December 17. 2014
/s/ WALUACE._~

04:43:24 PM

}
District-.Comtliidge/
-:.-:::.. ;'_'·, ._,;;/

Da:t ?~ E~Te ~7193
("as~~/\\/. J~\vkes # l 0232

Sc,.i;:r County i\rror:ie:;·' s Ot11~e
x.35 Ea~t 30(; North! Sui~~ i i~•C:
R~chfieki. Utah ~470 I
Tdcpho~c: (435) 896-26'75
F2x ~o.: ~435; 896-:706

IN THE DISTRICT COCRT GF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

IN _;__;"\!D FOR SSVIER COUNTY, STATE OF lTfAH

Ai'vtENDED JUDGMENT
Vs.

Case No. 121600009
\;!!CEAE. L. ~AY,
D()R: 2/ l {): l 9R6

· Judge

Wallace A. Lee

------- ·- -· --·-----·-·----------Th~ abcve-captio:1d ~art.::r havi:::.g come before the Court for sentencing on November
25.2014. pursu~nr io conv:c~10ns

lG

~he offenses of Possession of a Controlled Substance.

Marij;1s..:."12. \.Vith Imem ro Distribut.: and Production of a Controlled Substance., Marijuana. both

Thi:-c D~grc~ Fdo~1i~s, ~::.:. ?ossessic)n of Drug Paraphemalia. a Class B Misdemeanor; and the
C.::L::-t hav;:-,g cm:crt~ined ~he :1rgumcnt., of Casey W. Jewkes for the State of Utah~ and of
;:.;r:r!c!.h Co:;1bs. C0;.H1sc~ fer rh~ Dc:-~ndam:. and being apprised of no further impediment to

:\70\V THEREFORE. ~egarding Possession of a Controlled Substance~ Marijuan~ With

:)ecerr:ber ~ 7. 20~4 04:43 Pf\i1

1 of 4

Irrt:=nt !o Di:;r:ib:.He and P,o.:iu:.:rio:1 of a Conrroilc::d Substance. Marijuana. both Third Degree
F~lorri~s, .:)~rend.an: is semcnced to serv~ a term of 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison on each
c0um, 2::d fr:ieC

:r; r::e ~m0~r:: of S5.D00.00 p1us the state surcharge and court security fee on

Regz.r<ling Pcssess~on (}! D:-t:g Par2phemalia. a Class B Misdemeanor, the Defendant is
. months
. m
. rhe
. ~ev1er
'"' . Caunty Jai·1 and fimed m
. the amount of
se:;t~:-!cec. :o se.r-,..:e a term or" s~x
S 1.(}{}{1 .. f)O pl;:s

±c S!at~ surcharge and court security fee;

?!'ov1ded the semence~ ~re ordered to run concurrently if ever seived; and

Provided r..rrther rhat exe-~urion of the confinement sentence sha11 be stayed and all but

S950.00 of the fine and s1..:rc:1arge suspended subject to the successful completion of a thirty-six
(36; montn ;-,eriod of prcba::Gn unde:- the direction and control of the Department of Adult

?;obatio!1 and ?erole~ \vhich probation. i!:! addition to all normal and customary terms shall

conts.1n r:1e fo!lov1ing condirions:

2. The Dcfe:1da:nr wiii s~rvt"; forty-five (45) days in the Sevier County Jail
b~gi:1~ing Tk.:crnbcr 1. 2G 14. at 6:00 p.m. ~o be served as straight time without special release or
r~vie'..v 'h'ith eredit for 7 <lays previously served.

3. The Defen<lam sia!l pay the fine and surcharge at the rate of at least $50.00
_?er :n0mh~ a:; d~rectcd by L7c Dep~me:n 0:- Adult Probation and Parole~ with all unpaid monies
x2~g imcr~st ct !!~e Srar~'~ j:1dgrr.:ent rate. The balance remaining of the full amount plus
~cc~cd i::tcrest mus~ be paid

;)!1:;:

n:~1m.:~ rrior to the end of probation.

2of4

-~-

..... The DefendEi;t will not use. consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs~
frequem places -..vhere a;con~jc hev.::-ages or illegal drugs are being consume~ or be in the
ccr:1pany of persons -.vhc are consuming or who are under the influence of alcohol or illegal

.:; The Defend2nt wi~~ S;.:bn1ir to searches of person. vehicle. and property and to

~t':z:l:-cs ofblcod, breath, and urine upon the request of any law enforcement officer without the

n~c~ssirv· of nrob~bl;:: ca.us;:.
6. Within th:r~y days, ~r:.c Dc-fendant shall submit to collection of a DNA sample
by re?urting w ::he Sevier Co;.;.::ry Jai1 d";J=-ing business hours and paying the fee.
7. 7he Dcfend:an~ wi; 1ohUiin a substance abuse evaluation from a recognized

~:0\':Ce;, prc\·iic a copy of the ev~bation to 1he Court and will complete any recommended

S. T~1~ C0:1::: ::-e::ain~ j !..!r:sdic!ion to entenain a motion to reduce the severity of the

~ffcnsc: on;: d:!gre~

!.!?Q:1

Jlc ex.=mp!z.-ry completion of 36 months of probation.

____________ E:\'D OF ORDER___________

DP iVERYCERTlFICATE
A tr-Jc and correc: cGpy ofth-: foregoing AMENDED JUDGMENT was delivered to the
tcl!O\\:'i:.g as i::dicat~d:

301 ?\. 2(:0 E.. Suit~ 3-E
Sr. Gc'1~gc! L.T &47-:-:(;

'v·ia Efiling ~)·srer::

3of4
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Sevier Count:-' Jail
835 E. 300 ~Richfield.. CT 8470 l
via regt:lar mail

Dept. of .A.du1t Probation and Parok
835 E. 3C-O "!'-,;_

Richtleld, L1T S4701
\.'ia en12.il
Central Li~ Narco!ics Task Force
765 S. Highway 99
Fi!lmore, UT 84631
via regular maii

ISi Kristi Turner _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Kristi Turner.. Paralegal

@
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Addendum _,B_,
Amended Judgment, filed December 15, 2014
("Hanson Judgment")

P. Ey-rc ±:7193
C. as~:':" \ 1/. J~,~/kcs #l!.}232
s~~:icr County Attorney's Office
83.5 Ea~t 3(JC1 ~crrh. Suire 100
Richfield, Utar. 84701
T dephon~: {435) 896-26:5
Fa.x ).Jo.: (4.35) 896-1706

;)a}e

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH RJDTCIAL DISTRICT
!N A;\D ~OR SEVIER COlJNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF CT.A.H~
?1ai;.~ii1'

. AME~l)ED JUDG:rvtENT

v~.
Case No. 121600010
TRACY L. HANSO!\~
· DOB: 5130/1975
Dcfendam.

Judge Wallace A. Lee

., - ----- ---- -·-····-·---·· -··· -·-~--- · · · - - i

Tnc above-captiond matter hav~,g come before the Court for sentencing on November
25. 20 l 4. purst!ant to ~onvic!iorrs to the offenses of Possession of a Controlled Substance,

\farij~ani, \'Vid: Inte.l:!t w Dist7fou!e, ?mduc!ion of a Controlled Substance, Marijuana. and

f-e:sscssion of a Firea:-m by a Resu!cred Person, all Third Degree Felonies, and Possession of
'Drng Paraphernalia. a Cb~~: B ~fisdeme(!nor; and the Court having entertained the arguments of
C as;:y W. Jc'\.::kes for the Stare cf l;rah. and of Kenneth Combs. Counsel for the Defendant~ and

0ace:nt~r ~5. 2014 04:30 ?M
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'\"O\V THEREFORE. Regard~ng Possession ofa Controlled Substance.. Marijuan~ With
:::~rem to Distribute, Production of a Controlled Substance, Marij~ and Possession of a
Firearm by a Restricted Person. aH Third Degree Felonies> Defendant is sentenced to serve a
term o-t0-5 years in the Ctah State Prison on each count, and fined in the amount ofS5,000.00

ftiu.s !h~ stare scrcharg-: ~""le co~r: security fee;! on each count;
Regardir.g Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. a Class B Misdemeanor.. the Defendant is
scntciccd to scr·ve a r~!'m of six mo!1ths in the Sevier County Jail and fined in the amount of
S 1.00G.OG pi~s the state su!:"d1arge and court security fee;
Provided the scr;:en~es ere 0:dered to nm concurrently if ever served; and
?rovicled further ~;c.~ execuricn of the confinement sentence shall he stayed and all but

5950.G() of ~he fine and surcharge suspended subject to the successful completion of a thirty-six
t36) month period ofprobarion und~r the direction and control of the Departm~nt of Adult

Proo2tinn and ?amk; v,;hich probation. in addition to all normal and customary terms shall
contai:: the follc\i.ting conditions:
1

Violate :10 laws.

2. The De::endznt \~..·rn s~rve forty-five (45) days in the Sevier County Jail

':)cgi:mmg
- . . n~e-c~m0er
'
·: • Lv:
"'·' · .:.r.
~ ar 0:01.)
" ·" ,~ p.m. to 'oe served as stra1g
. ht time
. wlt. hout spec1a
. 1release or
:-ev~cw with credit for 2 ~fa:,·s previously served.

3. The .Defencar:r shaH pi::y

me fine and surcharge at the rate of at least $50.00

?er :no~~r;. as d.i~ected by :h.: Dt:partm~r:.t of Adult Probation and Parole, with all unpaid monies

be:::rir:g interest at the State's judgment rate. The balance remaining of the full amount p]us

8ace:nbei ~ 5. 20:4 C-4:30 ?M
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..

ac~rt:~c mtcreS:

i'?.1-:.!S~

.oc ?:::;~
- . one m<.mtr.. pnoi
. ro rhe
. en d o f probanon.
.

4. The Defo!1dant '.vill nm use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs,

frequent ?hces where akor:0Ec b~v.=rages or illegal drugs are being consumed,. or be in the
company o-f persons whc arc consurr.i;1g or •,J\.·ho are under the influence of alcohol or illegal

5. Tne Defe;idan.t ~.:in submit to searches of person. vehicle. and property and to

sciz..;r~i o( blooc, brcati~. and u:ine. upon the request of any law enforcement officer without the
•

..

•

•

I

necc~s1ry o! p:00201e cause,
6. \Virhi!': ~½frry days. ~he D~fendant shall submit to collection of a DNA sample
hy rcport!!7.§

t0

the Sevier Cm:my J:d du~illg business hours and paying the fee.
: . The Dcfen..iaT;t -.;.:iii o~tai:: a .substance abuse evaluation from a recognized

!}rcvidcr. p.:cvide a ccpy of the evaluarion to th~ Court and will complete any recommended
rreatn:ent.. ali at r:?1e Defendant's o,~ln ccsr.

8. The C c~r. re!.ains jurisdiction to entertain a motion to reduce the severity of the

(>TY°e,isc ~!1~ d~gree upon fr.e exemplary cor:-,pierion of 36 months of probation.

- - - - - - - - - - - E\:u OF ORDER----------D;;UVERY CERTIFICATE
A :me znd ~orreci ~opy of the forcgoi;-:g A MENDED JUDGMENT was delivered to the

Kenneth Con:hs
3{): :\. 200 E.~ Suite 3-E
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Sr. George. L"f 847i0
via Efiling system
Sevier County Jail
~GS E. 300 N.
Richfield .. UT 84701
via regular maii
@

Dept. of Ad.ult Probation and Parole
835 E. 300"N.
Richfield .. UT 84701

.
..
v1a email

Cenrrai Crah Narcotics Task Force
765 S. Highway 99
Fi1!more, UT 84631
-='"ti2, regular mail

/SI Kristi Turner _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Kristi Turner, Paralegal
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